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Explaining the Variation in the Europeanization of Business: an 
Institutionalist Theory. 
Matia Vannoni 
ABSTRACT Although the EU provides valuable political opportunities for business, firms act at 
European level in different degrees and in different ways. This variation in the Europeanization 
of business has so far been partially overlooked by the literature. In this work I propose an 
institutionalist theory of the Europeanization of business by focusing on how national political 
institutions mediate the impact of the institutional structure of the EU on business behaviour. 
Findings from a large-N analysis across several countries demonstrate that firms in decentralized 
countries tend to be more active at EU level. National political institutions affect also how firms 
act at EU level. Indeed, those firms used to act individually at national level tend to act 
collectively at EU level. This work aims at a more nuanced institutionalist account of 
Europeanization, by bridging the gap between the traditional literature on comparative politics 
and the one on European interest representation. 
KEY WORDS: business lobbying; European Union; Europeanization; federalism; multilevel 
governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Why are certain firms more active at European level than others? Why do certain firms further 
their interests by addressing European institutions directly while others by acting through 
business associations? The mobility of interests, especially business interests, from a venue to 
another and their interest representation strategies represent questions of central importance for 
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American and European scholars of interest group politics. On top of that, in the 1990s a strand 
of European studies started to investigate how and why national actors tend to assume similar 
behaviours when dealing with the European Union (EU), with the concept of Europeanization. 
Nonetheless, the literature has so far provided scattered pieces of evidence on the 
Europeanization of business: what determines the variation in Europeanization across firms is 
still waiting for an answer. In this work I introduce an institutionalist theory of the 
Europeanization of business by bridging the gap between two literatures which have contributed 
to the explanation of business behaviour in (rational choice) institutionalist terms: the literature 
on comparative politics and the literature on European interest representation.  
This work proceeds as follows. I commence by arguing for an institutionalist approach to 
investigate the process of Europeanization. Although different scholarships have focused on the 
role national and European institutions exert on business behaviour I claim the need for further 
research on how national institutions mediate the effect of European institutions on business 
behaviour. In this vein, I outline the role national and European institutions exert on business 
behaviour, as proposed by the literature. In the ensuing section I introduce the institutionalist 
theory of Europeanization which unfolds that process into two theoretically and empirically 
separate mechanisms: the multilevel and the functional mechanisms. I derive hypotheses on the 
behaviour of business for those two mechanisms by building on the literature on comparative 
politics and the literature on European interest representation. Then, I conclude by showing the 
results of the analysis and underlining the implications those results bear. 
EXTANT INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNTS ON EUROPEANIZATION 
Although the literature on Europeanization agrees that the shift in competences from national 
arenas to European ones has drawn firms to the EU few theoretically and empirically informed 
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claims able to account for this process have been put forward. Indeed, the soft spoken 
assumption in the traditional works on Europeanization has hitherto been that the process of the 
Europeanization of business is rather straightforward and thus does not require further 
investigation. The main determinant of the Europeanization of firms is argued to be material 
resources. This explains the paucity of works dealing specifically with business. Nonetheless, the 
high variation in the degree and mode of Europeanization across firms suggests that the 
Europeanization of business deserves further inquiry.  
The strand of the literature on Europeanization which focuses on how and why interest groups 
engage at the European level from an organizational perspective (Beyers 2002; Beyers and 
Kerremans 2012; Klüver 2010; Eising 2007) points at the right direction. As argued by Beyers 
and Kerremans (2007), societal actors do not automatically shift from the national to the 
European level: ‘although the EU creates many new opportunities for domestic groups to adapt, 
Europeanization is not a natural or immediate response’ (Beyers and Kerremans 2007, 477). 
Rather, the different institutional contexts in which interest groups act mediate the process of 
Europeanization.  
This (rational choice) institutionalist literature on the Europeanization of interest groups 
(Schmidt 2001; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Cowles 2001; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010) has 
so far put forward two main arguments: the goodness of fit and the degree of access (Klüver 
2010). The goodness of fit claim states that societal actors based in national institutional settings 
similar to the European one tend to adapt better to the Europeanization process. The focus has 
been on the decentralization of power and the mode of interest representation: firms based in 
decentralized and (neo-)corporatist countries are deemed to adapt more easily to the EU 
institutional structure. Along with the goodness of fit, another major argument in the literature is 
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the degree of access (Klüver 2010; Eising 2007). Interest groups with limited access at national 
level tend to be excluded also at European level (the persistence hypothesis) or to compensate for 
that limited access and hence to be more active at European level (the compensation hypothesis).  
Nonetheless, contradictory findings have been drawn. Indeed, although Beyers (2002)  finds 
general empirical support on the role of national institutional settings and Klüver (2010) 
demonstrates that French statist mode of interest representation incentivizes interest groups to be 
more proactive at EU level hence finding evidence for the compensation hypotheses other 
studies have come to different results. Eising (2007) concludes that the multi-level structure of 
the EU has more impact on interest groups’ access to the EU than the different domestic 
institutional settings. Confusion on the role of national institutional settings on the 
Europeanization of societal actors prevails also in related fields of studies. From an interest 
population ecology perspective Wessels (2004) provides evidence that the relative fragmentation 
of interests at national level is proportional to the one at EU level. Nonetheless, this relationship 
reveals to be insignificant for business. In conclusion, although there is a general agreement on 
the necessity to account for how national institutional settings mediate the effect of 
Europeanization confusion still prevails on how to theoretically and empirically account for this 
process of mediation. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF EUROPEANIZATION: THE MULTILEVEL AND 
THE FUNCTIONAL MECHANISMS 
In this work I claim that the literature on the Europeanization of interest groups has so far 
oversimplified the role of European and national institutions: this explains the contradictory 
findings showed above. Indeed, the national and European levels are more than institutional 
contexts to be fitted or venues across which actors shop. Although those aspects are important 
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(and hence investigated also in this work) institutions have a deeper influence on business 
behavior. The literature has so far overlooked the actual interest representation dynamics by 
focusing exclusively on access. Not only do national institutions mediate the push for 
Europeanization but they also incentivize certain forms of action on the part of firms and the 
same holds true for European institutions.  
By bridging the gap between the literature on comparative politics and the one on European 
interest representation I introduce an institutionalist theory of Europeanization which investigates 
the adaptation of firms to the opportunity structure of the EU (Coen 2007b; Coen and 
Dannreuther 2003), as mediated by national political institutions. In doing so, I propose to unfold 
the process of Europeanization into two distinct mechanisms, namely the multilevel and the 
functional mechanisms. The former accounts for to what extent firms act at EU level and how 
this can be explained by the goodness of fit between the European and the national institutional 
settings. The functional mechanism refers to how firms act at EU level and it considers how 
national political institutions mediate the effect European institutions bear on interest 
representation. 
The Multilevel Mechanism 
The economic and political incentives for a firm to act at European level have almost come to 
balance those to act at national level and are arguably common to all firms. Nonetheless, the EU 
is also characterised by a distinct institutional structure which arguably facilitates the 
Europeanization of certain firms against others. By building on two mainstream comparative 
politics theories I derive an hypothesis on the role of national political institutions in mediating 
the effect of Europeanization: the federalism theory (Kelemen 2004) and the multilevel 
governance theory (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks 1996; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996).  
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In the last decades increasing attention has been devoted to the adaptational process societal 
actors undergo as a consequence of Europeanization (Börzel and Risse 2003). In the words of 
Börzel and Risse (2003, 2), ‘from a rationalist perspective following the “logic of 
consequentialism”, the misfit between European and domestic processes, policies, and 
institutions provides societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints to 
pursue their interests’. In other words, the adaptational process which results from 
Europeanization bears differential effects on member states depending on their national political 
institutions. In this vein, two strands of the comparative politics literature can shed light on this 
process. 
The literature on federalism has recently shifted the attention from the distribution of power to 
the logic of functioning of institutions (Burgess 2000; Fabbrini 2010; Kelemen 2004). As applied 
to the EU this shift of academic attention has led scholars to concentrate on how the logic of 
functioning of European institutions affects the relationship between the EU and member states. 
Indeed, the EU imposes not only regulatory standards in several policy domains but also policy 
styles to member states (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). The multi-level governance theory 
on its part conceives the EU as a web of interconnected levels of governance where different 
types of actors interact with European institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The focus in not on 
the top-down imposition of policy styles, as it is for the federalism theory, but on the horizontal 
and vertical relationships between different centres of informal governance (Peters 2008) where 
both European and national public and private actors interact with each other.  
The MLG and the federalism theories arguably bear the same explanatory implication for the 
role of national institutions in the multilevel mechanism of Europeanization. Firms based in 
countries where authority is diffused both at horizontal and at vertical level, such as Germany, 
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tend to adapt easily to the Europeanization process. Conversely, firms based in highly centralized 
countries, such as France, encounter more difficulties in adapting to that process. I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms based in decentralized countries are more likely to act at EU level  
The Functional Mechanism 
By bridging the gap between the traditional literature on comparative politics and the literature 
on European interest representation, I focus on an aspect of Europeanization so far overlooked 
by the literature, namely the functional mechanism. Not only does the EU incentivise firms to act 
at European level but it also incentivises specific interest representation dynamics. Indeed, the 
EU incentivises firms to act simultaneously through direct and collective action. Nonetheless, 
also national political institutions matter with respect to how firms act in the political arena.  
One of the most valuable contributions to the unpacking of the relationship between European 
institutions and societal actors has been provided by the European literature on interest 
representation. Although being part of same discipline, the low level of cross-fertilization 
between the literature on the Europeanization of interest groups and the more general literature 
on EU interest representation is surprising. The argument is that the EU and especially the 
Commission have actively developed a distinct interest representation system with distinct norms 
and rules which in turn incentivize firms to act at EU level as well as certain behaviors on the 
part of firms. As a response to the increase in the number of interest groups and the widening of 
European competences in the 1990s, the EU started to shape the relations with interest groups in 
an active manner in order to maintain the flow of technical and reliable information on which EU 
officials rely on a daily basis. This strategy has been aimed to create a distinction between 
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outsiders and insiders by utilising the incentive of non-policy benefits, such as the inclusion in 
the Commission’s network of policy fora, committees and so on and so forth (Coen 2007b, 2009; 
Coen and Katsaitis 2013). In order to access this club interest groups have to adopt certain 
practices (Broscheid and Coen 2003), such as collaboration with other interests at EU level 
(Coen 2009, 2007a). This division between insiders and outsiders has been particularly marked 
in the relationship between European institutions and firms (Coen and Grant 2000). As a result, 
the European interest representation system has witnessed the emergence of common patterns of 
behaviour actively supported by European institutions.  
The literature on European interest representation (Bouwen 2002, 2004; Chalmers 2011; Kluver 
2011) demonstrates that certain interest representation practices are associated with certain 
functions (Michalowitz 2007) which in turn are associated with more or less access to the 
European institutions. The European Commission and the European Parliament grant access to 
credible and trustworthy firms which represent a genuinely European interest. In this vein, firms 
are incentivised to simultaneously put in practice individual and collective action practices in 
order to adapt to those institutional demands. Indeed, collective action at European level is 
associated by the literature to the representation of European interests (Bouwen 2002, 2004) 
whereas individual action is functionally associated with credibility (Michalowitz 2007). 
Accordingly, firms are arguably incentivised by European institutions to act both individually 
and collectively at EU level. 
The literature on comparative politics on its part provides theoretically informed arguments on 
how political institutions shape business behaviour. By focusing on what have been labeled 
traditional institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984), such as the electoral 
system, comparative politics has investigated how the behavior of societal actors and, especially 
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business, and their interaction with the public authority differ across countries (Berger, 
Hirschman, and Maier 1983; Lehmbruch 1984; Schmitter 1974, 1977; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 
1979).  
The electoral system, as argued by the traditional literature on comparative politics (Lijphart 
1984; Lijphart 1977; Scharpf 1984) and by historical analyses on comparative political economy 
(Lawson and Merkl 1988; Maier 1984; Maier 1981), determines the mode of interaction between 
societal actors. This has been recently formalized by Martin and Swank (2008) and Martin and 
Swank (2012), who focus on the ease with which a firm can access the political agenda. In those 
countries with a majoritarian electoral system the access to the political agenda is easier and thus 
firms tend to act alone in the political arena. Conversely, in consensual countries access is 
hindered by the proportional electoral system thus incentivizing firms to collaborate among each 
other by acting outside the political arena. In arguing so, Martin and Swank (2008) provide 
theoretical foundation and empirical evidence to the claim that whilst countries with proportional 
electoral systems tend to be characterized by neocorporatist arrangements majoritarian countries 
by pluralist arrangements. Figure 1 illustrates the regression plot between the disproportionality 
of the electoral system and the degree of corporatism in European countries1. 
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Figure 1 Regression Plot between the Disproportionality of the Electoral System and the Degree 
of Corporatism 
 
In conclusion, European institutions incentivize the firm to adopt both collective and individual 
interest representation practices whereas national institutions incentivize firms to adopt either 
one or the other according to their character. In countries with majoritarian electoral systems and 
pluralist arrangements (what are labelled competitive countries) firms tend to act individually 
whereas in countries with proportional systems and neocorporatist arrangements (what are 
labelled consensual countries) the opposite holds true. Four hypotheses are drawn: 
H2a: Firms based in competitive countries are more likely to act individually at EU level 
H2b: Firms based in competitive countries are more likely to act collectively at EU level 
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H3a: Firms based in consensual countries are more likely to act collectively at EU level 
H3b: Firms based in consensual countries are more likely to act individually at EU level 
The logic behind those hypotheses is close in spirit to the persistence and compensation 
hypotheses (Beyers 2002), familiar to the literature on the Europeanization of interests. Those 
hypotheses stem from the degree of access approach that literature has hitherto assumed (Eising 
2007; Klüver 2010): they respectively argue that the more access an actor enjoy at domestic level 
and the more or the less it enjoys access at EU level. Nonetheless, the hypotheses put forward in 
this section refer to functional persistence and compensation and they focus on the actual interest 
representation dynamics. The former argues that the firm acts in the same manner both at 
national and EU level whilst the latter posits that the firm differentiates its lobbying portfolio 
pursuing different strategies across the two levels. 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The dataset used in this work draws data from Wonka et al. (2010)2. From that dataset I drew a 
sample consisting of all the 304 firms based in European member states present in the dataset3. 
Common practice in the literature is comparative case study research: large N analyses are rare 
in this field of study, but few notable exceptions (Eising 2007) are present. On top of that, almost 
all those works focus exclusively on the usual suspects: Germany, UK, France, Belgium and 
Netherlands. A sample with more variation in national political institutions as well as other 
factors is needed. For instance, the variation in the Europeanization of societal actors between 
old and new member states needs further investigation.  
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The Europeanization of a firm needs to be operationalized in a different manner according to the 
mechanism under investigation. Indeed, the multilevel mechanism refers to the degree of 
Europeanization whereas the functional one to the different interest representation practices. For 
the multilevel mechanism I propose a composite index of whether a firm has a EU office and the 
membership in European associations whereas for the functional one I associate the former to 
individual action and the latter to collective action, as done in the literature (Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009). The coding of the composite index can be found in the Appendix (Table A1). 
As for the functional mechanism, the literature on European interest representation demonstrates 
that European (business) associations are functional to represent European interests (Bouwen 
2002, 2004; Michalowitz 2007). Similarly, Michalowitz (2007) functionally associates in-house 
lobbyists with credibility. This claim is also supported by a European affairs manager when 
questioned about the value added of a EU office with respect to other forms of interest 
representation in the poll conducted for this work: ‘Close monitoring of policy developments and 
intellegence [intelligence] gathering in due time cannot be delegated. It depends on a network of 
trustful relations with key stakeholders, which in turn requires a permanent presence’ 
(anonymous respondent 1, 2010 emphasis added)4.  
As for the EU office, both the European affairs office in Brussels and in the headquarters are 
considered. Two sources are used. Data is gathered from the various EA booklets (EA 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2008a)5 and the Joint Transparency Register (JTR). Firms’ involvement in 
European associations is measured with the number of European associations of which the firm 
is member: I collect data from the Joint Transparency Register (JTR) (CEC 2012a). The 
influence European institutions exert on business interest representation is operationalised into 
the access firms enjoy in the Commission and the European Parliament. Indeed, the more the 
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firm enjoys direct access to the European institutions the more likely it is that the firm is subject 
to their influence. The access to the European Parliament is measured with the presence of a 
corporate representative for the European Parliament: data are collected from the Joint 
Transparency Register (JTR). 
I use the membership of a firm in the Commission expert groups as operationalization for the 
access of firms to the Commission. The expert groups are consultative bodies established by the 
Commission or its services and their role is to advise the Commission (CEC 2010). They usually 
deal with highly technical sectors where EU officials most need specific expertise. Two aspects 
make these policy fora a valid operationalization of a form of access to the Commission suitable 
for this analysis. First of all, the Commission expert groups represent the largest information 
gathering system in the EU and they are located in one of the most neuralgic stage of the 
decision-making process, namely the pre-proposal stage. Secondly, the Commission expert 
groups arguably represent an example of the proactive role European institutions play in shaping 
interest representation mentioned above. The Commission has always enjoyed total discretion 
over both their composition and their creation (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2013, 2008). Gornitzka 
and Sverdrup (2007) find empirical evidence for the relationship between the number of expert 
groups in a policy areas and the number of interest groups active in that policy area. This 
supports the claim that the expert group system is characterised by the phenomenon theorised by 
Broscheid and Coen (2003), namely the active use on the part of the Commission of non-policy 
benefits in order to regulate the inflow of information. I collect data for the membership of firms 
in those groups from the Register of the Commission Expert Groups and other Similar Entities 
(CEC 2012b).  
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The two mechanisms theorised above take into consideration three national political institutions. 
The multilevel mechanism focuses on the level of decentralization of a country. This is measured 
with the Regional Authority Index (RAI) introduced by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2008)6. 
That index combines a measure of the power enjoyed by a subnational authority in the country as 
a whole as well as over its own territory. The functional mechanism of Europeanization takes 
into consideration two correlated political institutions: the electoral system and the degree of 
corporatism. I use the Least Squares index (LSq), which measures disproportionality between the 
distributions of votes and of seats (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005), for the disproportionality of the 
electoral system. As for corporatism, I use the Siaroff index which measures the political and 
economic integration of societal actors and I collect data from the dataset provided by Bernhagen 
and Mitchell (2009).  
I control for factors which the literature considers relevant for the Europeanization of firms. 
Building on both the American (Ozer and Lee 2009; Gilligan 1997; Alt et al. 1999) and the 
European (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009) literature on business interest representation firm size 
deserves attention since it may influence the practices undertaken by firms. I operationalise firm 
size with the number of employees drawing data from AMADEUS (BvD 2013). Whether a firm 
(or its European branch) is based in a new or old member state may also affect the degree and 
form of Europeanization: I differentiate between those member states which joined the EU in the 
2004 enlargement and those which were also before. A summary of the variables introduced in 
this section can be found in the Appendix (Table A2). 
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ANALYSIS 
Both individual and collective action practices are rather common across the firms in the sample. 
Indeed, roughly 60 per cent of the firms in the sample have an EU affairs office either in their 
headquarters or in Brussels and the average number of European associations in which a firm is a 
member is four, with some multi-national corporations being member in more than 20 European 
associations. European member states vary greatly with respect to political institutions. Indeed, 
the Regional Authority Index varies from 0 associated to Luxembourg, namely the most 
centralised member state, to the 29.3 of Germany. The same holds true for the electoral system 
and the degree of corporatism, which are closely related, as shown above. The sample goes from 
proportional and corporatist countries, such as Germany which scores respectively 3.4 and 4.125, 
to majoritarian and pluralist countries, such as the UK which scores respectively 15.1 and 2.  
I commence by testing the hypothesis related to the multilevel mechanism of Europeanization 
and then I proceed to testing the functional ones. Given that the 304 firms in this sample are 
clustered into 18 countries I fit a simple variance-components model, which estimates the 
variation accounted for by each level of the hierarchy, in order to test for the necessity of 
multilevel analysis. Findings show that 13 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable for 
the multilevel mechanism of Europeanization can be attributed to differences across countries. 
This suggests that multilevel analysis is needed. In this vein, I need to fit a random slope model 
which allows the explanatory variables to have a different effect for each group, namely a 
different slope and not only a different intercept, as in random intercept models. The model for 
the first analysis is as follows: 
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EUIntegrationfc= β0 + (β1+ u1fc) (Commissionfc) + (β2+u1fc) (EPfc) + (β3+ u1fc) (Sizefc) + (β4+ u1c) 
(Old MSc) + (β5+ u1c) (RAIc)+ u0c + efc 
The random slope model has two parts: a fixed part, represented by the intercept and the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable and a random part, namely u1fc, u0c and efc. The element 
u0c represents the unexplained variation at country level and efc is the unexplained variation at 
firm level after controlling for the explanatory variables. As mentioned above, the slope for each 
independent variable varies across groups: for instance, β1 represents the slope of the variable 
Commission averaged across groups to which variation for each group (u1fc) is added.  
Table 3 shows the results for the ordered logistic multilevel analysis for the variable 
Europeanization. The access of a firm to the Commission and the European Parliament is 
associated to the degree of Europeanization of that firm. As can be seen in Model 3, the 
coefficients of those variables are both statistically significant and take the values of 1.116 and 
1.778. In this vein, European institutions affect business behaviour incentivising firms to take an 
active role at EU level. Similarly, the degree of decentralization of the country where the firm is 
based is associated with whether and to what extent the firm acts at EU level. The coefficient of 
the variable RAI is statistically significant and of the expected sign, namely 0.0291 (in Model 3). 
Accordingly, in more decentralised countries, such as Germany, the firm acts more at European 
level: this confirms H1. In this vein, firms based in countries with a decentralized system similar 
to the European one tend to adapt more to the process of Europeanization. The size of a firm is 
also a determinant of its level of Europeanization, as foreseen by the literature. Indeed, larger and 
arguably more resourceful firms tend to be more active at EU level. Finally, whether a firm is 
based or not in an old member states does not affect the level of Europeanization. Surprisingly, 
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although it would be reasonable to believe that firms based in old member states have more time 
to adapt to the process of Europeanization this does not find empirical evidence.  
Table 3 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Analysis for Europeanization 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Commission 1.171*** 1.154*** 1.116*** 
 (0.359) (0.360) (0.362) 
EP 1.727*** 1.731*** 1.778*** 
 (0.315) (0.316) (0.318) 
Size 0.00665*** 0.00669*** 0.00653*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00171) 
Old MS  0.871 0.550 
  (0.961) (0.976) 
RAI   0.0291* 
   (0.0149) 
Constant 1 0.429*** 1.286 1.516 
 (0.157) (0.960) (0.968) 
Constant 2 0.464*** 1.320 1.550 
 (0.157) (0.960) (0.968) 
Constant 3 3.769*** 4.632*** 4.880*** 
 (0.318) (1.008) (1.018) 
    
Observations 304 304 304 
Number of groups 18 18 18  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 and 5 illustrate the testing of the functional theory of Europeanization. Table 4 shows the 
results for the linear multilevel analysis for the variable European association. Again, European 
institutions strongly affect firms’ behaviour at EU level: the more a firm enjoys access to the 
Commission and the European Parliament and the more that firm is involved in European 
associations. As shown in Model 4 of Table 4, enjoying access to the Commission or the EP 
increases the number of European associations in which the firm is member respectively by 
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2.786 or 2.5. As for national political institutions, no statistically significant relationship is 
found: neither the functional persistence nor the compensation hypotheses find empirical 
support. In other words, national political institutions do not affect a firm’s collective action at 
EU level. In this case the impact of the European institutional structure is so strong that it thwarts 
the role of national political institutions. As above, also the size of the firm matters for whether 
the firm acts collectively at EU level but not whether it is based in an old member state. 
Table 4 Linear Multilevel Analysis for European Association 
     
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Commission 4.223*** 2.846*** 2.777*** 2.786*** 
 (0.710) (0.693) (0.697) (0.698) 
EP 3.333*** 2.472*** 2.481*** 2.500*** 
 (0.591) (0.567) (0.568) (0.567) 
Size  0.0195*** 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 
  (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
Old MS  1.995 1.874 1.935 
  (1.798) (2.009) (2.010) 
Disproportionality   -0.0360  
   (0.0670)  
Corporatism    0.187 
    (0.331) 
Constant 2.708*** -0.149 0.143 -0.721 
 (0.308) (1.785) (2.052) (2.249) 
     
Observations 304 304 304 304 
Number of groups 18 18 18 18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Logistic Multilevel Analysis for the EU Office 
 
 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Commission 1.900*** 2.077** 2.064** 2.148** 
 (0.668) (0.885) (0.976) (1.046) 
EP 2.484*** 2.246*** 2.389*** 2.297*** 
 (0.717) (0.646) (0.711) (0.661) 
Size  0.00992*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 
  (0.00292) (0.00299) (0.00298) 
Old MS  1.090 1.280 1.090 
  (1.080) (1.163) (1.076) 
Disproportionality   -0.0457**  
   (0.0210)  
Corporatism    0.306** 
    (0.139) 
Constant -0.232* -1.740 -1.543 -2.679** 
 (0.124) (1.101) (1.178) (1.195) 
     
Observations 304 304 304 304 
Number of groups 18 18 18 18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 illustrates the results of the logistic multilevel model for the variable EU office. As 
above, the access to European institutions is strongly related to the firm’s behaviour: in this case 
the more the firm has access to those institutions and the more it pursues individual action at EU 
level. The odds of having a EU office for a firm with access to the Commission or the EP over 
those of a firm without access are respectively 5.84 and 6.24 (in Model 4). In other words, a firm 
with access to the European institutions (either the Commission or the EP) has roughly six times 
more chances to have a EU office than a firm without access (but similar in all other respects). 
The size of the firm is again significant and whether the firm is based in an old member state 
does not matter. The more interesting findings concern the role of national institutions. Empirical 
evidence supports the functional compensation hypothesis, namely H3b. Indeed, firms based in 
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proportional and corporatist countries tend to act more individually at EU level. The coefficient 
for the variable Corporatism is significant and of the expected sign, namely 0.306 (in Model 4). 
Before discussing further the results a consideration is due. Cross-sectional analysis often needs 
further scrutiny with respect to reverse causality and the latter is a particularly serious issue in 
Europeanization studies.. Beyers (2002), indeed, acknowledges the nuances of the analysis of 
Europeanization: ‘another feature of multilevelness is that actors can be both subject and object 
of influence attempts by other actors’ (p.595).Europeanization can be conceived as interactions 
with both institutions and other private interests. The researcher needs to take clear stances on 
which direction the relationship between access to European institutions and interest 
representation dynamics (comprising interaction with other actors) takes.  
By building on the literature on European interest representation and more specifically on the 
interest overload argument (Broscheid and Coen 2003, 2007) I posit that the Commission shapes 
business behaviour through non-policy benefits, among which the membership in the 
Commission expert groups can be listed. As formally modelled in Broscheid and Coen (2003), 
the use of non-policy benefits in order to regulate the inflow of information from interest groups 
is theoretically and empirically prior to the change in behavior of interest groups, change which 
in this case is labelled Europeanization. In this vein, access to the Commission expert groups (as 
a proxy of the influence European institutions exert on societal actors) determines interest 
representation dynamics and not the other way round.  
Nonetheless this issue bears also more practical implications. In more formal terms, in the 
regression model above the explanatory variable may be related to the unobserved factors 
affecting the dependent variable (Sovey and Green 2011). This can severely bias the analysis 
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preventing thus the capacity to infer a causal relationship from the findings above. In this vein, I 
replace Commissionfc with an instrumental variable (labelled Commission IV), which measures 
whether a firm has been awarded EU tendering contracts in the past7. This variable is related to 
Commissionfc but not to the unexplained variance in the model (u0c + efc). In choosing such a 
variable, ‘IV regression in effect replaces the problematic independent variable with a proxy 
variable that is uncontaminated by error or unobserved factors that affect the outcome’ (Sovey 
and Green 2011, 188). 
 
The award of tendering contracts in the EU depends exclusively on the economic value of the 
bids and whether they respect the technical standards set out in the call. Differently from the 
calls issued by national and local authorities which deal mainly with building and civil 
engineering (Cox and Furlong 1997) calls from EU institutions and agencies concern mainly 
highly technical services. Accordingly, firms with great technical expertise in their own sectors 
usually win those bids (Cox and Furlong 1997; Nielsen and Hansen 2001). The technical 
expertise of a firm in its own sector drives also the choice of who seats in the Commission expert 
groups. As mentioned above, Commission expert groups represent the largest suppliers of 
technical expertise for EU officials in various policy areas. Furthermore, the capacity to be 
awarded tendering contracts is not related to the unobservable factors affecting whether a firm 
acts at EU level and how it does so. Although it is plausible that interest representation dynamics 
affect access to the Commission it is not plausible that they affect the level of technical expertise 
of a firm in its own sector.   
I test whether by substituting Commissionfc with Commission IV in the regression models above 
I obtain the same results. It should be noticed that for computational ease I do not use multilevel 
analysis but I cluster standard errors across countries. For reasons of space regression tables can 
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be found in the Appendix (Table A3, A4, A5). The regression analyses show high Wald tests of 
exogeneity demonstrating that the assumption that the dependent and the instrumental variables 
are exogenous is valid.  Results from the instrumental variable analysis do not differ with respect 
to the explanatory variables: this provides strong robustness to the results presented in this work. 
A puzzle is present: why is the functional compensation hypothesis valid only for individual 
action and not for collective action? An answer may be found in the different costs of 
Europeanization. Collective action at EU level in the form of membership to European 
association is less costly than individual action. In this vein, collective action may be conceived 
as soft budget-constraint form of Europeanization. Accordingly, regardless of how the firm acts 
in its own country it can afford to act at collective level at EU level. Conversely, individual 
action in the form of a permanent EU affairs office, for instance, is a hard budget-constraint form 
of Europeanization. In this case what Beyers and Kerremans (2007) term critical resource 
dependence applies: firms do not automatically translate their resources into interest 
representation at EU level and this holds true particularly for costly strategies. 
In conclusion, I find evidence for the differentiation of firms’ lobbying portfolio between 
national and European level, especially with respect to hard budget-constraint practices. Indeed, 
firms in corporatist countries differentiate their lobbying portfolio by acting individually at EU 
level, along with collectively at national level. Contrariwise, firms in pluralist countries already 
have government affairs and in house lobbyists at domestic level: creating new ones purposely 
for the EU level would be excessively costly. This rationale applies only to hard budget-
constraint forms of Europeanization and not, for instance, for collective action in the form of 
membership in European association, which is a rather inexpensive practice. I demonstrate that 
not only does the misfit between the national setting and the EU one affect the Europeanization 
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of business, as already suggested by the literature, but also that the actual interest representation 
dynamics and their costs matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The institutionalist theory of the Europeanization of business interests provides an explanation 
for the variation in the degree of Europeanization as well as in the interest representation 
dynamics across firms. Indeed, the institutional structure of the EU exerts a strong influence on 
business behavior both in terms of whether firms act at EU level and in terms of their actual 
practices. This influence is, nonetheless, mediated by the role of national political institutions. 
Indeed, the degree of decentralization of a country affects the capacity of a firm to adapt to the 
European institutional architecture: firms based in decentralized countries tend to be more active 
at EU level. The functional mechanism of the institutionalist theory of the Europeanization of 
business interests provides a theoretically sound explanation for the role of national political 
institutions, such as the electoral system and the degree of corporatism. Nonetheless, the costs of 
different forms of Europeanization should also be taken into consideration. 
The institutionalist approach embraced in this work is only the starting point in the hope that 
further research will be conducted in order to explain the variation in Europeanization across 
firms. The ontogenetic development of the literature on the Europeanization of business can be 
predicted by looking at the phylogenetic development of contemporary political science. Indeed, 
both of them started from a behaviorist perspective before adopting institutionalist premises. 
This is the state of the art in the literature on the Europeanization of business interests. 
Nonetheless, contemporary political science has already moved to investigate factors other than 
traditional institutions, such as culture, social norms etc. Future research should follow those 
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steps and focus on the role management structures as well as business cultures, for instance, 
influence the process of Europeanization of business. 
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NOTES 
1 For data sources and operationalization of variables see below. 
2This dataset maps the interest group population active at EU level by drawing data from three 
distinct sources: the CONECCS, the EP register and the Landmark directories.  
3Data shows that almost all firms are involved in regulatory policies: health, agriculture, 
transport and energy. On top of that, common areas of interest among firms are present, such as 
competition or employment and social affairs. In this vein, it is not necessary to control for the 
sector in the analysis below. 
4A survey was directed to 178 government and European affairs managers on 10 January 2012. 
Contacts were drawn from the 180 Company Representations in Brussels, European Agenda 
Booklet (EA, 2007). The survey consisted mainly of ordinal scale questions along with few open 
questions. 
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5 EA booklets are publicly available EU public affairs directories which map the main actors at 
the EU level as well as they supply their contact details. 
6 http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data_ra.php. 
7 Data was drawn from the JTR under the entry Financial Data. 
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